Since the ancients (as we are told by Pappus) esteemed the science of
mechanics of greatest importance in the investigation of natural things,
and the moderns, rejecting substantial forms and occult qualities, have
endeavored to subject the phenomena of nature to the laws of mathematics,
I have in this treatise cultivated mathematics as far as it relates to
philosophy. The ancients considered mechanics in a twofold respect; as
rational, which proceeds accurately by demonstration, and practical. To
practical mechanics all the manual arts belong, from which mechanics took
its name. But as artificers do not work with perfect accuracy, it comes
to pass that mechanics is so distinguished from geometry that what is perfectly
accurate is called geometrical; what is less so, is called mechanical.
However, the errors are not in the art, but in the artificers. He that
works with less accuracy is an imperfect mechanic; and if any could work
with perfect accuracy, he would be the most perfect mechanic of all, for
the description of right lines and circles, upon which geometry is founded,
belongs to mechanics. Geometry does not teach us to draw these lines, but
requires them to be drawn, for it requires that the learner should first
be taught to describe these accurately before he enters upon geometry,
then it shows how by these operations problems may be solved. To describe
right lines and circles are problems, but not geometrical problems. The
solution of these problems is required from mechanics, and by geometry
the use of them, when so solved, is shown; and it is the glory of geometry
that from those few principles, brought from without, it is able to produce
so many things. Therefore geometry is founded in mechanical practice, and
is nothing but that part of universal mechanics which accurately proposes
and demonstrates the art of measuring. But since the manual arts are chiefly
employed in the moving of bodies, it happens that geometry is commonly
referred to their magnitude, and mechanics to their motion. In this sense
rational mechanics will be the science of motions resulting from any forces
whatsoever, and of the forces required to produce any motions, accurately
proposed and demonstrated. This part of mechanics, as far as it extended
to the five powers which relate to manual arts, was cultivated by the ancients,
who considered gravity (it not being a manual power) no otherwise than
in moving weights by those powers. But I consider philosophy rather than
arts and write not concerning manual but natural powers, and consider chiefly
those things which relate to gravity, levity, elastic force, the resistance
of fluids, and the like forces, whether attractive or impulsive; and therefore
I offer this work as the mathematical principles of philosophy, for the
whole burden of philosophy seems to consist in this--from the phenomena
of motions to investigate the forces of nature, and then from these forces
to demonstrate the other phenomena; and to this end the general propositions
in the first and second Books are directed. In the third Book I give an
example of this in the explication of the System of the World; for by the
propositions mathematically demonstrated in the former Books, in the third
I derive from the celestial phenomena the forces of gravity with which
bodies tend to the sun and the several planets. Then from these forces,
by other propositions which are also mathematical, I deduce the motions
of the planets, the comets, the moon, and the sea. I wish we could derive
the rest of the phenomena of Nature by the same kind of reasoning from
mechanical principles, for I am induced by many reasons to suspect that
they may all depend upon certain forces by which the particles of bodies,
by some causes hitherto unknown, are either mutually impelled towards one
another, and cohere in regular figures, or are repelled and recede from
one another. These forces being unknown, philosophers have hitherto attempted
the search of Nature in vain; but I hope the principles here laid down
will afford some light either to this or some truer method of philosophy.
In the publication of this work the most acute and universally learned Mr. Edmund Halley not only assisted me in correcting the errors of the press and preparing the geometrical figures, but it was through his solicitations that it came to be published; for when he had obtained of me my demonstrations of the figure of the celestial orbits, he continually pressed me to communicate the same to the Royal Society, who afterwards, by their kind encouragement and entreaties, engaged me to think of publishing them. But after I had begun to consider the inequalities of the lunar motions, and had entered upon some other things relating to the laws and measures of gravity and other forces; and the figures that would be described by bodies attracted according to given laws; and the motion of several bodies moving among themselves; the motion of bodies in resisting mediums; the forces, densities, and motions, of mediums; the orbits of the comets, and such like, I deferred that publication till I had made a search into those matters, and could put forth the whole together. What relates to the lunar motions (being imperfect), I have put all together in the corollaries of Prop. lxvi, to avoid being obliged to propose and distinctly demonstrate the several things there contained in a method more prolix than the subject deserved and interrupt the series of the other propositions. Some things, found out after the rest, I chose to insert in places less suitable, rather than change the number of the propositions and the citations. I heartily beg that what I have here done may be read with forbearance; and that my labors in a subject so difficult may be examined, not so much with the view to censure, as to remedy their defects.
Cambridge, Trinity College, May 8, 1686
Rule I: We are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances. To this purpose the philosophers say that Nature does nothing in vain, and more is in vain when less will serve; for Nature is pleased with simplicity, and affects not the pomp of superfluous causes.
Rule II: Therefore to the same natural effects we must, as far as possible, assign the same causes. As to respiration in a man and in a beast; the descent of stones in Europe and in America; the light of our culinary fire and of the sun; the reflection of light in the earth, and in the planets.
Rule III: The qualities of bodies, which admit neither intensification
nor remission of degrees, and which are found to belong to all bodies within
the reach of our experiments, are to be esteemed the universal qualities
of all bodies whatsoever. For since the qualities of bodies are only known
to us by experiments, we are to hold for universal all such as universally
agree with experiments; and such as are not liable to diminution can never
be quite taken away. We are certainly not to relinquish the evidence of
experiments for the sake of dreams and vain fictions of our own devising;
nor are we to recede from the analogy of Nature, which is wont to be simple,
and always consonant to itself. We no other way know the extension of bodies
than by our senses, nor do these reach it in all bodies; but because we
perceive extension in all that are sensible, therefore we ascribe it universally
to all others also. That abundance of bodies are hard, we learn by experience;
and because the hardness of the whole arises from the hardness of the parts,
we therefore justly infer the hardness of the undivided particles not only
of the bodies we feel but of all others. That all bodies are impenetrable,
we gather not from reason, but from sensation. The bodies which we handle
we find impenetrable, and thence conclude impenetrability to be an universal
property of all bodies whatsoever. That all bodies are movable, and endowed
with certain powers (which we call the inertia) of persevering in their
motion, or in their rest, we only infer from the like properties observed
in the bodies which we have seen. The extension, hardness, impenetrability,
mobility, and inertia of the whole, result from the extension, hardness,
impenetrability, mobility, and inertia of the parts; and hence we conclude
the least particles of all bodies to be also all extended, and hard and
impenetrable, and movable, and endowed with their proper inertia. And this
is the foundation of all philosophy. Moreover, that the divided but contiguous
particles of bodies may be separated from one another, is matter of observation;
and, in the particles that remain undivided, our minds are able to distinguish
yet lesser parts, as is mathematically demonstrated. But whether the parts
so distinguished, and not yet divided, may, by the powers of Nature, be
actually divided and separated from ane another, we cannot certainly determine.
Yet, had we the proof of but one experiment that any undivided particle,
in breaking a hard and solid body, suffered a division, we might by virtue
of this rule conclude that the undivided as well as the divided particles
may be divided and actually separated to infinity.
Lastly, if it universally appears, by experiments and astronomical observations, that all bodies about the earth gravitate towards the earth, and that in proportion to the quantity of matter which they severally contain; that the moon likewise, according to the quantity of its matter, gravitates towards the earth; that, on the other hand, our sea gravitates towards the moon; and all the planets one towards another; and the comets in like manner towards the sun; we must, in consequence of this rule, universally allow that all bodies whatsoever are endowed with a principle of mutual gravitation. For the argument from the appearances concludes with more force for the universal gravitation of all bodies than for their impenetrability; of which, among those in the celestial regions, we have no experiments, nor any manner of observation. Not that I affirm gravity to be essential to bodies: by their vis insita I mean nothing but their inertia. This is immutable. Their gravity is diminished as they recede from the earth.
Rule IV: In experimental philosophy we are to look upon propositions
inferred by general induction from phenomena as accurately or very nearly
true, notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses that may be imagined, till
such time as other phenomena occur, by which they may either be made more
accurate, or liable to exceptions. This rule we must follow, that the argument
of induction may not be evaded by hypotheses.
The hypothesis of vortices is pressed with many difficulties. That every
planet by a radius drawn to the sun may describe areas proportional to
the times of description, the periodic times of the several parts of the
vortices should observe the square of their distances from the sun; but
that the periodic times of the planets may obtain the 3/2th power of their
distances from the sun, the periodic times of the parts of the vortex ought
to be as the 3/2th power of their distances. That the smaller vortices
may maintain their lesser revolutions about Saturn, Jupiter, and other
planets, and swim quietly and undisturbed in the greater vortex of the
sun, the periodic times of the parts of the sun's vortex should be equal;
but the rotation of the sun and planets about their axes, which ought to
correspond with the motions of their vortices, recede far from all these
proportions. The motions of the comets are exceedingly regular, are governed
by the same laws with the motions of the planets, and can by no means be
accounted for by the hypothesis of vortices; for comets are carried with
very eccentric motions through all parts of the heavens indifferently,
with a freedom that is incompatible with the notion of a vortex.
Bodies projected in our air suffer no resistance but from the air. Withdraw the air, as is done in Mr. Boyle's vacuum, and the resistance ceases; for in this void a bit of fine down and a piece of solid gold descend with equal velocity. And the same argument must apply to the celestial spaces above the earth's atmosphere; in these spaces, where there is no air to resist their motions, all bodies will move with the greatest freedom; and the planets and comets will constantly pursue their revolutions in orbits given in kind and position, according to the laws above explained; but though these bodies may, indeed, continue in their orbits by the mere laws of gravity, yet they could by no means have at first derived the regular position of the orbits themselves from those laws.
The six primary planets are revolved about the sun in circles concentric with the sun, and with motions directed towards the same parts, and almost in the same plane. Ten moons are revolved about the earth, Jupiter, and Saturn, in circles concentric with them, with the same direction of motion, and nearly in the planes of the orbits of those planets; but it is not to be conceived that mere mechanical causes could give birth to so many regular motions, since the comets range over all parts of the heavens in very eccentric orbits; for by that kind of motion they pass easily through the orbs of the planets, and with great rapidity; and in their aphelions, where they move the slowest, and are detained the longest, they recede to the greatest distances from each other, and hence suffer the least disturbance from their mutual attractions. This most beautiful system of the sun, planets, and comets, could only proceed from the counsel and dominion of an intelligent and powerful Being. And if the fixed stars are the centres of other like systems, these, being formed by the like wise counsel, must be all subject to the dominion of One; especially since the light of the fixed stars is of the same nature with the light of the sun, and from every system light passes into all the other systems; and lest the systems of the fixed stars should, by their gravity, fall on each other, he hath placed those systems at immense distances from one another.
This Being governs all things, not as the soul of the world, but as Lord over all; and on account of his dominion he is wont to be called Lord God [followed by Greek words], or Universal Ruler; for God is a relative word, and has a respect to servants; and Deity in the dominion of God not over his own body, as those imagine who fancy God to be the soul of the world, but over servants. The Supreme God is a Being eternal, infinite, absolutely perfect; but a being, however perfect, without dominion, cannot be said to be Lord God; for we say, my God, your God, the God of Israel, the God of Gods, and Lord of Lords; but we do not say, my Eternal, your Eternal, the Eternal of Israel, the Eternal of Gods; we do not say, my Infinite, or my Perfect: these are titles which have no respect to servants. The word God usually signifies Lord; but every lord is not a God. It is the dominion of a spiritual being which constitutes a God: a true, supreme, or imaginary dominion makes a true, supreme, or imaginary God. And from his true dominion it follows that the true God is a living, intelligent, and powerful Being; and from his other perfections, that he is supreme, or most perfect. He is eternal and infinite, omnipotent and omniscient; that is, his duration reaches from eternity to eternity; his presence from infinity to infinity; he governs all things, and knows all things that are or can be done. He is not eternity and infinity, but eternal and infinite; he is not duration or space, but he endures and is present. He endures forever, and is everywhere present; and, by existing always and everywhere, he constitutes duration and space. Since every particle of space is always, and every indivisible moment of duration is everywhere, certainly the Maker and Lord of all things cannot be never and nowhere. Every soul that has perception is, though in different times and in different organs of sense and motion, still the same indivisible person. There are given successive parts in duration, coexistent parts in space, but neither the one nor the other in the person of a man, or his thinking principle; and much less can they be found in the thinking substance of God. Every man, so far as he is a thing that has perception, is one and the same man during his whole life, in all and each of his organs of sense. God is the same God, always and everywhere. He is omnipresent not virtually only, but also substantially; for virtue cannot subsist without substance. In him are all things contained and moved; yet neither affects the other: God suffers nothing from the motion of bodies; bodies find no resistance from the omnipresence of God. It is allowed by all that the Supreme God exists necessarily; and by the same necessity he exists always and everywhere. Whence also he is all similar, all eye, all ear, all brain, all arm, all power to perceive, to understand, and to act; but in a manner not at all human, in a manner not at all corporeal, in a manner utterly unknown to us. As a blind man has no idea of colors, so have we no idea of the manner by which the all-wise God perceives and understands all things. He is utterly void of all body and bodily figure, and can therefore neither be seen, nor heard, nor touched; nor ought he to be worshiped under the representation of any corporeal thing. We have ideas of his attributes, but what the real substance of anything is we know not. In bodies, we see only their figures and colors, we hear only the sounds, we touch only their outward surfaces, we smell only the smells, and taste the savors; but their inward substances are not to be known either by our senses, or by any reflex act of our minds: much less, then, have we any idea of the substance of God. We know him only by his most wise and excellent contrivances of things, and final causes; we admire him for his perfections; but we reverence and adore him on account of his dominion: for we adore him as his servants; and a god without dominion, providence, and final causes, is nothing else but Fate and Nature. Blind metaphysical necessity, which is certainly the same always and everywhere, could produce no variety of things. All that diversity of natural things which we find suited to different times and places could arise from nothing but the ideas and will of a Being necessarily existing. But, by way of allegory, God is said to see, to speak, to laugh, to love, to hate, to desire, to give, to receive, to rejoice, to be angry, to fight, to frame, to work, to build; for all our notions of God are taken from the ways of mankind by a certain similitude, which, though not perfect, has some likeness, however. And thus much concerning God; to discourse of whom from the appearances of things, does certainly belong to Natural Philosophy.
Hitherto we have explained the phenomena of the heavens and of our sea by the power of gravity, but have not yet assigned the cause of this power. This is certain, that it must proceed from a cause that penetrates to the very centres of the sun and planets, without suffering the least diminution of its force; that operates not according to the quantity of the surfaces of the particles upon which it acts (as mechanical causes used to do), but according to the quantity of the solid matter which they contain, and propagates its virtue on all sides to immense distances., decreasing always as the inverse square of the distances. Gravitation towards the sun is made up out of the gravitations towards the several particles of which the body of the sun is composed; and in receding from the sun decreases accurately as the inverse square of the distances as far as the orbit of Saturn, as evidently appears from the quiescence of the aphelion of the planets; nay, and even to the remotest aphelion of the comets, if those aphelions are also quiescent. But hitherto I have not been able to discover the cause of those properties of gravity from phenomena, and I frame no hypotheses; for whatever is not deduced from the phenomena is to be called an hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, whether of occult qualities or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy. In this philosophy particular propositions are inferred from the phenomena, and afterwards rendered general by induction. Thus it was that the impenetrability, the mobility, and the impulsive force of bodies, and the laws of motion and of gravitation, were discovered. And to us it is enough that gravity does really exist, and act according to the laws which we have explained, and abundantly serves to account for all the motions of the celestial bodies, and of our sea.
And now we might add something concerning a certain most subtle spirit which pervades and lies hid in all gross bodies; by the force and action of which spirit the particles of bodies attract one another at near distances, and cohere, if contiguous; and electric bodies operate to greater distances, as well repelling as attracting the neighboring corpuscles; and Light is emitted, reflected, refracted; inflected, and heats bodies; and all sensation is excited, and the members of animal bodies move at the command of the will, namely, by the vibrations of this spirit, mutually propagated along the solid filaments of the nerves, from the outward organs of sense to the brain, and from the brain into the muscles. But these are things that cannot be explained in few words, nor are we furnished with that sufficiency of experiments which is required to an accurate determination and demonstration of the laws by which this electric and elastic spirit operates.
1. Dr. Pocock derives the Latin word Deus from the Arabic du (in the oblique case di), which signifies Lord. And in this sense princes are called gods, Psal. Lxxxii. ver. 6; and John x. ver. 35. And Moses is called a god to his brother Aaron, and a god to Pharaoh (Exod. iv. ver. 16; and vii. ver. 1). And in the same sense the souls of dead princes were formerly, by the Heathens, called gods, but falsely, because of their want of dominion.
2. This was the opinion of the Ancients. So Pythagoras, in Cicer. de Nat. Deer. lib. i. Thales, Anaxagoras, Virgil, Georg. lib. iv, ver. 220; and Aeneid, lib. vi. ver. 721. Philo Alleger, at the beginning of lib. i. Aratus, in his Phaenom. at the beginning. So also the sacred writers: as St. Paul, Acts xvii. ver. 27, 28. St. John's Gosp. chap. xiv. ver. 2. Moses, in Deut. iv. ver. 39; and x. ver. 14. David, Psal. cxxxix, ver. 7, 8, 9. Solomon, 1 Kings viii ver. 27. Job, xxii. ver. 12, 13, l4. Jeremiah, xxiii. ver. 23, 24. The Idolaters supposed the sun, moon, and stars, the souls of men, and other parts of the world, to be parts of the Supreme God, and therefore to be worshiped; but erroneously.