from his An introduction to the history of the Turkic peoples: ethnogenesis and state-formation in medieval and early modern Eurasia and the Middle East. Wiesbaden 1992.
In the Pre-Modern Era, the steppes of Eurasia served as one of the major crossroads of civilization. Men, goods and ideas traversed these vast expanses with remarkable rapidity in an age that was oriented to the pace of animals rather than the hum of engines. This Eurasian world was divided into three economic systems which sometimes interacted symbiotically and sometimes came into bloody conflict. Historical accounts have largely focused on the latter since the clash of arms has always seemed more worthy of notice. The two major economic systems represented here were the sedentary-agrarian and pastoral nomadic. Of considerably less importance militarily and politically were the hunting-gathering cultures of the forest zone. These, however, were important economically because of the lucrative fur trade and formed a significant substratal element in the shaping of steppe culture since it was the environment from which many of the steppe peoples sprang. Shamanism, an important aspect of the cultic practices and beliefs of the steppe peoples undoubtedly had its origins, in part, if not entirely, in the great forests.
Sedentary society in this Eurasian steppe world was largely confined to the Eastern European forest and forest-steppe zone which, however, steadily encroached on the steppe pasturages and the urban oasis-based societies perched on the southern rim of the steppes. These oasis-statelets were the outermost cultural and often political extensions of the great imperial structures of the Mediterranean world: Roman-Byzantine, Iranian, Arabo-Islamic, with the full panoply of religious and cultural influences that those variants of Mediterranean civilization entailed, e.g. monotheistic religions. Matching these "western" influences were the powerful currents emanating from the Indian subcontinent and China, civilizations that have put their permanent stamp on East and Southeast Asian society. It is in this milieu, in this historical and cultural context of the interaction of nomad and sedentary, steppe and sown, that the genesis of the peoples of Eurasia took place.
The purpose of this work, however, is not to give a detailed exposition of the history of Eurasia, but rather, to provide an introduction to the history of one of its ethno-linguistic groupings: the Turkic peoples. We will trace the rise and fall of their polities, assess their interaction with other societies and comment on their ethnogenesis.
A detailed examination of the formation of any one of the Turkic peoples reveals, not unexpectedly, that this was a multi-layered process. It is, of course, a situation that is not unique to the Turkic world. Recent research suggests that the criteria for delineating an ethnic community (ethnie) are a "named human population with shared ancestry myths, histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity.'' In Eurasia, these criteria were largely met in the Turk Qaganate and in a qualitatively different configuration in the Cinggisid realm. Following the collapse of the Turk state and the diffusion of the Turkic tribes, a variety of transformations took place. Separate and distinct ethnic communities and polities then developed or reemerged (e.g. Oguz, Qipcaq) retaining elements of the Old Turk culture but also growing in new directions. This is reflected in Mahmud al-Kasgari's presentation of the Turkic world in his Diwan Lugat at-Turk (dated 1077), a survey by a scion of the Qaraxanid dynasty. With the decline of Cinggisid unity and the Mongol realms, a similar process occurred. This time, however, long-established tribal unions, often of complex and disparate origins, had been broken up to form the building blocks of new confederations which in time, and often under outside pressure, became modern/modernizing peoples.
Given the lack of sources, it is difficult to measure the consciousness of these ties among the tribesmen of various Turkic polities. These often took in new elements, Turkic and non-Turkic. External sources, for example the Islamic historians and geographers of the Middle Ages, lumped them together as the "Turks" (al-Atrak), implying a cornmon origin and following the paradigm of the Arab tribes well-known to them. Current ethnogenetic studies have shown that although linguistic usage, i.e. terms employed by contemporary sources, nation seemed to refer to a common biological descent, in reality these communities were always polyethnic and political in character. Its members consisted of both those who were, indeed, born into it and those who joined it. Thus, it became a community of "descent through tradition" as well as through recognition of the political leadership of a charismatic clan. This process was equally operative in the Turkic world. Warfare helped to further define and cement these bonds.
In addition to these ties of a politico-military and economic nature, we must take into account the role of religion. This element, essential to any analysis of European or Near Eastern "proto-national" feeling has been almost completely neglected as an element of politics and consciousness-shaping in the steppe world prior to the victory of Islam in the region. Shamanism, the grass roots "religion" of the nomads and forest peoples of Central and Inner Asia, elements of which persisted as potent substratal forces in the religions later adopted by the Turkic peoples, provided another source of identification. We have yet to explore fully, however, the question of how it impinged on the consciousness of "those who draw the bow" in their self-definition. The Tengri (sky-god) cult was widespread among the Turkic peoples and served as a basic prop for the qaganal ideology. Clearly, it had an important political dimension. The adoption, subsequently, of a variety of universal religions (Buddhsim, Manichaeanism, Nestorian Christianity, Judaism and Islam), coming as the result of a complex interaction of political, cultural and economic forces (as everywhere else) also served as important markers of identity. This aspect of pre-Islamic Turkic political life needs further investigation.
We shall be dealing with groups that were (and some still are) primarily pastoral nomads. That is, their fundamental economic activity was livestock production which was carried out through the purposeful seasonal movement of livestock and their human masters (living in portable dwellings) over a series of already delineated pasturages in the course of a year. This was not aimless wandering in search of grass and water, as the cliche of the Chinese sources would have it. The ecology of a given group's particular zone determined, to a considerable extent, the composition and size of its herds and the attendant human camping units (usually 8-12 family units). This is a form of economic production that appears to have developed out of sedentary animal husbandry among groups that practiced both agriculture and stockbreeding. Most pastoral nomadic societies of Eurasia continued to practice some form of at least vestigial agriculture. Distinct forms of social and political organization evolved or were brought into being in response to the demands of this type of economic activity and the nature of the interaction of the nomads with their sedentary neighbors.
Turkic society, until very recent times, was, with the exception of the Ottoman Empire, Azarbayjan, the Middle Volga and the oasis cultures of Turkistan, largely tribal. Tribal elements figured prominently in early Ottoman history and although their political and social roles have almost totally disappeared, are not entirely absent from Turkish society today. A definition of "tribe" that would satisfy the many demands made on it by social scientists, remains elusive. Fried, in particular, emphasizes the shifting nature of tribal composition, warning, quite rightly, against extrapolations from present-day heterogeneity to an alleged state of pristine homogeneity in the past. Tribes are, he notes, "ad hoc responses to ephemeral situations of competition." They are "secondary phenomena" that can arise in response to the impact of more highly organized groups. There is a consensus that external pressures played a key role in the political development of the Eurasian tribes. The chief was of paramount importance in this structure. This was a dynamic, charismatic figure, it is argued, with whose fate the success or failure of the tribe was linked and from whom the tribe derived its identity. In a number of circumstances, particularly in the post-Cinggisid period, this was undoubtedly true. But, as with other definitions, it does not fit all the situations.
The family and clan were the basic underpinnings of this society. Families were not large (two generations of adults and children); the economy of the camping unit could not provide for more. Older sons were given their share of the family wealth and then moved off. The youngest son inherited his father's home and whatever remained. In theory, the clan was based on patrilineally related groups organized along lines of seniority. This is the "conical clan." Clans, however, could be more diffuse, not clearly articulated and not entirely sacrosanct. On the family and clan level, blood ties were more genuine than at higher levels of social organization. Clans, thus linked in a "segmentary structure" within the same tribe or tribal union, could come into conflict with one another. But, to the outside world they presented a "common front.'' Whatever the genealogical and other ties (real and spurious) may have been, tribal allegiance always involved an important element of political choice. In some measure, although leaders made ample use of kinship ties, a tribe was whatever following a chief could muster, i.e. those clans that formed the inner core and a less stable grouping of clans with shifting allegiances. The mobility of steppe society gave individuals and groups freedom of residence and hence, to some degree, freedom of political affiliation. The disgruntled and unhappy could leave and attach themselves to a new chief. Individuals, families and clans could decamp for "greener pastures." This mobility prevented the evolution of strong territorial links and allowed for great fluidity in social organization. As a consequence, kinship and genealogical structures, however fictitious and politically motivated, were given greater prominence as a vehicle for expressing political relationships. This also permitted great flexibility. Nomadic groups could easily regroup and re-form.
When Eurasian nomads found themselves outside of the steppe zone, in particular in the Near and Middle East, where they were forced to re-form and were able, for a time, to practice a more limited nomadism or semi-nomadism, the old terminology continued, but now often masked new realities. The tribes had fragmented and the role of the successful war leader, always important, became even more crucial in determining the identity of the group. This was reflected in tribal names. Thus, the Ottomans (Osmanli) were the "Men of Osman;" the Qizilbas were those who belonged to a specific religio-military organization recruited primarily from Oguz tribesmen in Anatolia and Iran who wore a characteristic headgear to symbolize their allegiance. While old Oguz tribal names were still to be found among them (e.g. Avsar, Cepni), there were many more new names of personal (e..g. Qasimlu) or geographical origin e.g. Rumlu, Samlu). The tribes had adapted and regrouped.
In this world of frequent shifts, in the steppe and even in close propinquity to sedentary society, linguistic and cultural unity were not necessary requirements. This does not mean that people were not aware of these ties. Mahu md al-Kasgari was cognizant of the differences of dialect and the linguistic features of those groups which were Turkicizing. "Purity of speech," especially in pronunciation and the absence of outside influences was a source of pride. "The most elegant of the dialects," he writes, "belongs to those who know only one language, who do not mix with Persians and who do not customarily settle in other lands. Those who have two languages and who mix with the populace of the cities have a certain slurring in their utterances....The most elegant is that of the Khaqani kings and those who associate with them.'' The latter was clearly a political criterion. We see here also the pride of the nomad, his sense of superiority over sedentaries. Language, however, was never a barrier. Various Turkic groups lived in intense symbiosis with non-Turkic elements without fully assimilating them (e.g. the Iranian-speaking Alano-As groupings among the Qlpcaqs).
The politically dominant tribe or clan often gave its name to the tribal union or confederation that it created. When this polity collapsed, the name of the new, dominant clan or tribe would come to the fore or the older clan names simply resurfaced. A scattering of tribes led to the appearance of tribal and clan names among a variety of groups. Sometimes, these fragments joined, producing names reflecting a micro-union of two clans or tribes (e.g. the Qitay-Qipcaq of the Ozbeks). Tribal names, among the Pre-Islamic and non-Islamicized groupings and in the Pre-inggisid era as a whole, fell into certain categories and patterns of name-giving. These, generally, denoted: geographical referents (e.g. Yis kizi), nomad/ wanderer (e.g. Qacar, Yoruk), nomadic raiders (e.g. Qazaq, Yagma), the number of constituent elements (e.g. Toquz Oguz), piece or remnant of a people (e.g. Qiriq, Kesek), names based on titles (e.g. Cor, Yula), submissive or peaceful ( e.g. Cuvas, Uygur), violence, violent forces of nature (e.g. Qarluq), strength, power, bravery, aggressiveness (e.g. Salgur, Qiniq), great fame or wealth (e.g. Bayaut).
The origins of Turkic tribal names are not entirely clear. It has long been held that tribal names developed out of clan names which, in turn, went back to an eponymous ancestor. This was the picture presented to the world by the tribal genealogies. This does not appear to be the pattern for tribal confederations. Moreover, with regard to the tribes, we do not find examples of this eponymic system until Turkic tribes had been under strong and prolonged Islamic or Mongol (Cinggisid) influence. It is only then that such tribal or political/dynastic names appear: Selcuk, Nogay, Osmanli, Cagatay. Similarly, there were few names of totemic origin. There are many names that cannot be etymologized on the basis of Turkic. These may point to non-Turkic origins or to terms that have long been forgotten. As with so many other elements of life in the nomadic world, names changed and moved around. Our sources often present a kaleidoscopic picture of constantly changing Turkic nomadic formations. Such changes did occur on the political, ruling level. But, often a confederation could have long periods of ethnic stability with a core of tribes, but changing elites.
In the Turko-nomadic world of medieval Eurasia, for which our sources are meager and largely written from the perspective of hostile, sedentary societies, the formation and decomposition of polities is only imperfectly reflected. As nomadic tribes, often of disparate origins, fought to create their polities, they forged an ethnos as well. The process of state-formation or polity-formation has, in the steppe, always been one entailing ethnogenesis. Il has also often come about in response to forces outside of nomadic society. Nomadic-sedentary interaction ranged over a broad spectrum of relationships, peaceful and hostile, depending on the political and economic needs of the two societies at a given time. Certainly, the traditional image of the Eurasian nomad as conqueror and despoiler is grossly exaggerated. Indeed, over the course of history, the nomad has been as much put upon as his sedentary neighbor. In the Modern Era, it is the nomad who has suffered the greatest losses. A variety of explanations have been offered regarding the causes of nomadic irruptions into the sedentary world: dessication of pasturages, the greed of the "barbarian" for the goods of "civilized" society, the need to interact economically with sedentary society. As we shall see, it was primarily the latter need that played the greatest role.
A major turning-point in human socio-political evolution was the movement from "primitive" to "advanced complex" society. The Turkic nomadic polities of Medieval Eurasia can best be described as moving between degrees of "primitive" and "advanced complex" forms of organization which we may term "traditional stateless" and "traditional early state" society. The former were, in theory, egalitarian societies that had little or no formal government. The primary sources of social cohesion were found in the requirements of kinship (both real and fictitious) and its obligations, tribal custom and the needs of a nomadic economy which demanded some degree of cooperation. Such a grouping, barely governing itself (a situation with which it was often quite content), was by definition incapable of governing others and hence could not subjugate them. "Complex society" is characterized by the development of central executive institutions (chieftainship and monarchy) which created sources of social cohesion beyond the kinship system: the state. When the political bonds of nomadic states dissolved, their constituent members often reverted to some less advanced variant of complex or traditional early state society or even to a form of traditional stateless society. Statehood was not a natural or even necessary condition for nomadic society.
Nomadism, as we have noted, is a system that must interact with other economies. Pastoral production is capable of creating great individual wealth, but it cannot generate the great quantity and varietv of foodstuffs that sedentary society does. Hence, it cannot support as large a population. Although sedentary and nomad alike faced the uncertainties of nature and man, nomadism was by far the more precarious system. A disturbance caused by epizootics, pastoral overproduction or raids could have far-reaching consequences in the steppe, bringing about the migration of tribes in search of new pasturages or the assaults of half-starved raiding parties on agrarian communities. In short, it resulted in war and conquest. Nomadism was merciless to those who could not maintain the minimum herd necessary for survival (usually 60-100 head of sheep, horses, cattle, goats and camels with sheep and horses predominant). Those who could not find relatives willing or able to help them rebuild or even to hire them as herders, were often forced to sedentarize. Such nomads became willing members of predatory bands that raided nomad and sedentary alike. Desperate men formed the nucleus of the comitatus that future conquerors gathered. The nomad with his highly developed equestrian skills was a redoubtable and feared warrior. These skills were exploited by both nomadic and sedentary societies. Some nomadic groups or individuals took service with surrounding sedentary states as allies (often marital alliances were part of this relationship), mercenaries or slave-soldiers (the gulams and mamluks of the Muslim world). Whatever the term or relationship, each of the sedentary states ringing the Eurasian steppes, had such units.
Conflict with sedentary society came largely over access to the goods of agrarian and urban production. Nomads traded or raided for these goods, adopting whichever strategy suited their capabilities of the moment. In essence, the militarily stronger of the two parties determined what form this exchange would take. Powerful empires, like China, whose posture towards the nomads was usually defensive, often used the prospect of trade as a means of control. Such contact and conflict could provide the impetus for nomadic state-building. Successful raiding was also a means by which the nomadic chieftain was able to stengthen his position, providing booty to be distributed to his followers and enhancing his charisma as warlord and diplomat.
The generation of nomadic states is still not fillly understood, largely because we have few documents coming from within the nomadic world that describe the goals of the state-builders. Given their tribal organization, continual training for war and the executive talents needed to move herds and people some distance, the state was latent in most Eurasian nomadic polities. It could be brought to the fore by internal pressures, stemming, perhaps, from fights over pasturages or access to goods. Even here, however, an aetiology outside of nomadic society is suspected. In these struggles, nomad was pitted against nomad, the victor either driving off the vanquished (who might, then, suddenly burst into a neighboring sedentary state incapable of fending them off) or incorporating the former foe into the triumphant tribal union. It is through this process of superstratification that a conquest state might be born. This was by no means a predetermined outcome. Moreover, sedentary states, responding to nomadic pressures or adopting an aggressive posture towards the steppe, might also serve as the catalyst. Or, nomads, seeking to expoit a sedentary society, were compelled by the military and diplomatic requirements of these activities to organize themselves into a state. In any event, current anthropological thinking places the greatest emphasis on outside catalysts deriving from relations with sedentary state societies. Centralized authority, however, could just as quickly disappear when the catalyst that had brought it into being was removed. Barfield views nomadic state-formation on the Chinese frontier as essentially deriving from the desire/need to exploit a strong Chinese economy. He has attempted to correlate nomadic state-formation, which he views as cyclical, with periods of strong, not weak, rule in China. Thus, according to this view, a united prosperous China was a necessary precondition for the development of a united nomadic state whose central ruling authority would be able to survive only by exploiting the agrarian giant to the south. The nomads, moreover, with the exception of the Cinggisid Mongols, did not seek to conquer China, which would disrupt the flow of goods in which they were vitally interested, but to extort from it what they could. Conquest came, according to him, from the Manchurian Mongolic and Manchu-Tungusic peoples, pursuing mixed nomadic and forest economies, who moved into the power vacuum when Chinese dynasties collapsed and established border statelets that eventually carne to control much of Northern China. Barfield's conceptualization of this process has many interesting as well as disputed points to which we shall return in the course of this work.
Another model of nomadic state-formation has been suggested by Omeljan Pritsak. He gives a primary role to the impact of international trade and "professional empire builders rooted in urban civilizations." Tribal chieftains, stimulated by contact with the cities and having developed a taste for the products of urban manufacture that passed in caravans across lands controlled by them, created a "pax" which both guaranteed the safety of the merchants and their goods and provided them with a share of the profits.
Despite or perhaps because of their appeal, the attitude of the nomads towards the rich cities of their sedentary neighbors was ambiguous. The urban centers with their mercantile populations and desired goods certainly beckoned. But, danger lurked in this temptation. In the Kul Tegin inscription, the Turk Bilge Qagan warns of the lure of China's "gold, silver and silk." "The words of the people (bodun) of Tabgac (China) are sweet, their treasure soft. Deceiving with sweet words and soft treasure, they make a distant people come close." Once lured in, the doom of this people is planned. China, the inscription cautions, "does not allow freedom to good, wise men, good, brave men." The Hsin tang-shu reports that when this same Bilge Qagan was tempted by the thought of building cities and temples, his famous counselor, Tonuquq dissuaded him from doing so by pointing out that it was their nomadic way of life that made them militarily superior to the armies of theT'ang. "If we adopt a sedentary urban life style," he notes, "we will be captured after only one defeat." The city, then, beckoned but also threatened with a loss of power and ultimately cultural genocide.
Nomads continually tested the military defenses of their neighbors. Momentary weakness or decline could result in their conquest of a sedentary state. This, however, could have far-reaching and often unwanted repercussions in nomadic society. The first of these was usually the sedentarization of the ruling clan, now a royal dynasty, and elements of the nomadic elite. As they adopted the trappings and culture of their newly conquered subjects, they became alienated from those of their fellow tribesmen who remained in the steppe. The rank and file nomads did not share in these benefits. The transformation of their chieftains into heaven-ordained rulers held little appeal for them. The take-over of a sedentary state, after the initial distribution of booty, gained them little. Indeed, insult was added to injury when the government then sought to tax them and control their movements. Nor were there necessarily opportunities for them in the new structure. The nomads, not having developed much in the way of government, were not, by and large, trained to be functionaries in agrarian-based, bureaucratic states, the basic institutions of which were left untouched by the nomadic conquerors. Such positions were, invariably staffed by those who had done so before, or by others, acquired elsewhere who were similarly trained. It was the nomadic elite and skilled sedentary groups that had joined them that gained from state-formation.
Statehood tended to further social and economic differentiation on all levels. Nomadic egalitarianism, an ideal not a reality in any event, was now even more distant. Chieftains became heavenly-conceived qagans who ruled because heaven so decreed and because they possessed the mantle of heavenly good fortune. The qagan might later become sultan and padisah, but the gulf that developed between the nomad, over whom the government now sought greater control, grew ever wider. The conquest of the sedentary states of the Near and Middle East or China led, for the most part, to the sedentarization and acculturation, to varying degrees, of their nomadic overlords and their immediate supporters. The tribesmen were often left not richer, but poorer and with less freedom. This could and did lead to revolts.
It is interesting to note that the nomadic charismatic ruling clans, the great imperial lines of which were extraordinarily long-lived (Hsiung-nu, Cinggisid, Ottoman), even when transformed into territorial rulers of largely sedentary societies, on the whole (the later Ottomans were one of the few exceptions) failed to resolve the question of orderly succession. The state was viewed as the common property of the ruling clan which exercized a "collective sovereignty" over the realm. Any member of the charismatic clan could claim leadership to the whole or at least part (an appanage) of the polity. This invariably led to bloody throne-struggles in which the mettle of the would-be ruler was not only tested but demonstrated on the battlefield. Victory signified the "mandate of heaven." The qagan/sultan/padisah possessed enormous personal power of which his successor would have to prove himself worthy.
It is apparent to even the casual observer, that the current demarcations of the Turkic peoples, in particular those in the Soviet Union, are the result of both complex historical processes and more immediate, specific political requirements. In some instances the differentiating "ethno-linguistic" criteria have, in reality, postdated not determined ethnogenesis. In others, minor variations have been exaggerated with a view towards separating otherwise closely related peoples. Thus, languages alone, in the modern era of nation- building, do not make nations, but nations, in a highly politicized process, frequently make languages. The antithesis of this approach has been to view the Turkic peoples as an undifferentiated or only very slightly differentiated mass. This, too, distorts historical reality. Any discussion of the ethnogenesis and formation of the Turkic peoples must bear in mind the extraordinary mobility of the pastoral nomads, the rapidity with which their political formations dissolved and re-formed, often with a change of some of the ethno-tribal components. Any discussion of ethnogenesis must also bear in mind the distinction between land and people. Turkic groups, themselves often of diverse tribal origins and ethnic histories, became political masters of lands that had very complex ethnic antecedents. Onto the original base of a non-Turkic population (usually Iranian, in Central Asia), itself the product of various ethnic strata, were grafted several waves of Turkic peoples at different times. Some degree of amalgamation, assimilation occurred, producing, in essence, a new but often still far from homogeneous people. Reflections of disparate origins may be seen in the material culture as well. Thus, the diversity of saddle arches used by a single Turkic people points to the variety of ethnic groups and subgroups that came to compose this people. The Ozbeks/Uzbeks provide one such example of a modern day Turkic people that has evolved, in a series of complex layers, out of a variety of Turkic and Iranian ethnies. Iranian speech is still a commonplace in "Uzbek" cities.
One of the remarkable features of Turkic history is the spread of the Turkic languages. As the language of the military-political elite in Central Asia and the Near and Middle East, it spread considerably beyond its physical borders. Nomadic populations, given the limitations of the nomadic economy, were usually smaller than those of their sedentary neighbors. Non-Turkic peoples, or groups of them, adopted the language without much in the way of actual mixing, at least in the early stages. In Central Asia and the Middle East, this could involve populations of some size. Examples of this may also be seen in those groups that adopted Turkic speech but because they were already long-standing adherents of monotheistic faiths and had acquired Turkic used in a lingua franca setting, did not go over to Islam which in the late Middle Ages increasingly became one of the most important markers of belonging to a Turkic people. Examples of such groups were the Qaraim and Krymchaks, the speakers of Armeno-Cuman, many Eastern Anatolian Armenians and very likely the Gagauz and Karamanli Greeks.
Turkic populations of today show extraordinary physical diversity, certainly much greater than that of any other group of speakers of an Altaic language. The original Turkic physical type, if we can really posit such, for it should be borne in mind that this mobile population was intermixing with its neighbors at a very early stage, was probably of the Mongoloid type (in all likelihood in its South Siberian variant). We may deduce this from the fact that populations in previously Europoid areas of Iranian speech begin to show Mongoloid influences coincidental with the appearance of Turkic peoples. The physical transformation of these Turkicizing peoples, however, never equalled the linguistic change which far outpaced it. This can be illustrated by the populations of Uzbekistan, Karakalpakia and especially the Turkic populations of Iran and Turkey itself. To add to the complexity of this process, the Turkic populations that moved into Central Asia were themselves already mixed. In general, then, the further east, the more Mongoloid the Turkic population is; the further west, the more Europoid.
Given this diversity of population and to a lesser degree language, not to mention the divergences of political history, can we truly speak of "Turkic History" ? What unites the Ottomans and Yaquts other than a very complex linguistic link ? Seemingly, not very much binds them other than a common origin, in the broadest sense. But, the overwhelming majority of the Turkic peoples have, in addition to a common point of origin and linguistic ties, a largely shared history and resultant culture as well. The overwhelming majority of the Turkic peoples have been part of the great Eurasian nomadic empires (although often in different capacities): Hsiung-nu, Turk, Cinggisid and Timurid. The imperial institutions and traditions developed in these empires played a role not unlike those of the Rornan Empire in shaping the political culture of Europe. Thus, there are common political and cultural threads that join Ottomans, Tatars, Ozbeks and more distantly the Cuvas. There are also significant points of divergence. Some scholars have preferred to underscore the elements held in common, others the differences. Present-day political considerations have not been entirely absent in the positions taken. Levels of national or ethnic consciousness are always difficult to measure. These may vary from individual to individual within a group as well as from group to group. The attitudes of medieval people are even more difficult to assess given the gulf of time and dearth of sources. In the course of this work, we shall be looking for both the ties that bind and the meaningful differences that distinguish.
This is a book of problems. Many of the events are only fleetingly illuminated by our literary sources. Linguistic, archaeological and ethnological data provide some, at times, crucial information. They also raise many questions. The provenance of this or that term may be disputed. Its historical, socio-linguistic significance is, perhaps, unclear. The attribution of this or that archaeological culture to a particular ethnic grouping, in the absence of linguistic evidence, may be entirely conjectural. Extrapolations based on the present day dynamics of a particular group do not automatically mean that their ancestors or groups related to them necessarily had the same mentalite, or thought in the same terms. Can we reconstruct the conduct of a medieval nomad on the basis of that of his modern descendent when the latter faces a very different political and to some extent even physical environment? The problems of interpretation are numerous. To these have been added the impositions of national historiographies which subtly or grossly distort further an imperfectly perceived historical reality. In an age suffused with nationalism, ethnogenetic studies, dealing as they must with the very core of the national myth, have, perforce, both deeply influenced the shaping of nationalist dogma and been influenced, in turn, by it. These attitudes are reflected, in varying degrees, in the literature dealing with the history of the various Turkic peoples. This work does not pretend to provide definitive answers to all the questions. Hopefully, it raises the right ones and provides a guide for further study.