in Halil Inalcik and Cemal Kafadar (eds), Suleyman the Second and His Time, Isis Press, Istanbul, 1993, pp. 219-228.
The diplomatic position of the Ottoman Empire as inherited by Suleyman, when he succeeded his father Selim I in September 1520, can without any risk of overschematization,.be summarily described a
-- Relentless confrontation with the heterodox Safavid State founded in Iran by Shah- Isma'il;
-- flexibility towards all other parties so long as the Safavids have not been utterly eliminated.
In a recent book, I have gone into the grounds and the evolution of the well-known conflict which since 1514 openly existed between the Sultan and the Shah. In order to apprehend the totally different stand taken by Suleyman the moment he acceded to the throne, it would be fitting to outline briefly the main points of this confrontation and the issues it entailed.
Selim, the only one amongst Bayezld II's sons whom nature had endowed with an innate political acumen, had perceived already when he was governor of Trebizond that the militant action exerted by tbe Shah's "missionaries" among the Turkmens of Anatolia meant, at a time when the Ottoman central administration was weakened, the most serious peril facing the empire since Timur's invasion: an internal gangrene of which the threatening eastern neighbour, gradually gathering strength, would benefit to the core. The fact that the religious precepts propagated by the Shah were openly heterodox, going beyond the theological rules acceptable to Islam, had certainly an impact on the violent hatred felt by Selim towards the Kizilbas. But the essential reason for it was the danger of internal disruption within the Ottoman Empire which became fully apparent during the 1511-1512 crisis. However, the solution to this internal problem was to be found abroad: by crushing the charismatic leader of his own subjects of heterodox leanings the Sultan would overcome their dangerous unruliness. Once seated firmly on the throne, Selim devoted all efforts to reach this target. He could, however, not attain it despite an overwhelming superiority in men and weapons, and notwithstanding a diplomadc activity displaying one of the most remarkably gifted polidcal minds in an era when there were quite a few. As far as political minds go, the Shah was certainly his equal and was able to detect the weak points of his opponent and prevent him from using his power. This is what happened: On the battlefield of Caldiran, on August 23, 1514, the Sultan's guns mowed down the Kizilbas who, themselves, inflicted very heavy losses upon an Ottoman army whose corps d'elite, the Janissaries, were not enthusiastic about fighting against the Shah who stirred in them a vague feeling of sympathy. Holding the ground but weary, the Sultan's men marched on to Tabriz but after a few weeks of drought, hunger, thirst and a trying early winter, they were bent on returning home to Anatolia. The memories of this campaign left their mark on Sellm's army. However hard he tried, these men would not take the road to Azerbaijan once again.
But the Sultan was not in a hurry. Banished from the Islamic community following a fetva of the Seyhul-islam, the Kilzibas were no more in a position to undertake military action in Anatolia. By imperial order all roads in Anatolia were closed to traffic with the Shah's dominions. With the conquest of Syria by Sultan Selim, Iran was to be cut off also from the West. It thus would gradually be deprived of its traditional commercial outlets, of food and other means of subsistence as well as of mineral ore supplies; asphyxia would gradually set in. Selim could thus afford to disregard the emissaries sent by the Shah to beg for peace and to throw them into prison as soon as they turned up.
As for Shah Isma'il, he had no more manpower to resist a second Ottoman attack, which he dreaded. As reported by an Ottoman spy in July 1516 he had only 18,000 men, many of whom were engaged in defending Khorasan against Uzbek assaults. To ward off a possible Ottoman attack, the Shah attempted to drag into war against the Ottomans any potential enemies they could have had, whether in the Moslem world or in Christendom, but to no avail. Finally, an attempt of a different nature brought about unexpected but effective results. The Shah wanted to equip his armies with firearms, which they lacked till then. A few guns were laboriously made operational and a detachment of arquebus musketeers followed the Shah wherever he went. With these weapons, which would have looked ridiculous if used on a battlefield, as compared to the Ottoman firepower, the Shah contrived a means of psychological warfare. Rumor, as spread by the Shah's agents, multiplied the number of these arrns beyond likelihood, and increased the fears of the Ottoman soldiers. Back from Egypt, Selim proclaimed that he would march on Iran. He confirmed this on his way from Damascus and Aleppo. Having reached the Euphrates in May 1518, he suddenly changed course and turned towards Istanbul, his army having obstinately refused to march on to Tabriz. It could well be that at that stage the Safavid state was saved, and perhaps it was due to the magnified image of these, in fact, rather few and mediocre firearms of the Shah. However, with the passing away of the Sultan two years later, this campaign plan was put off. When much later in 1533 the Ottoman army set out eastwards, it had to face a much less vulnerable enemy than at the time when they suddenly changed course at the banks of the Euphrates back in 1518.
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Indeed, Selim left his successor an empire in a much better state than the one he had taken over. Its borders now reached upper Egypt, the Hijaz, the river Euphrates down to Hit and the river Tigris down to Takrit in a pincer threatening Baghdad. In eastern Anatolia a glacis-like territory grouping local principalities, which were given the status of Ottoman sanjaks, served as a buffer between the vast beylerleylik (governorate) of Diyarbakir and the Shah's territories. This province of Diyarbakir was governed by Biyikli Mehmed Pasa, who was in the trust of Sultan Selim and acted as a true proconsul of the eastern marches. This border area was adequately manned with good troops which could meet a Safavid attack, however remote such danger. On the other hand, a new revolt by heterodox Anatolians led by Shah Veli b. Seyh Celal, brought about at the instigation of the Shah, had been repressed the previous year. The Sublime Porte could thus consider dlat peace was restored in these regions for a long time ahead.
In other fields, eight years of total war against the Shah left their mark in the Ottoman Empire. The army always dreaded the possibility of the start of a new campaign in Iran. It can be gathered from Ottoman sources that some people took advantage of this uneasiness to poison the atmosphere and work up minds, but it is not quite clear in whose interest these people acted. There was a real risk of the Janissaries revolting. Such revolt could flare up at the least pretext. These troops, though led by Selim to victory, never ceased to grumble. As regards the blockade clamped down on the Safavids, however hard it was on them, it also had repercussions on Ottoman merchants in their big business with the east. It was only fear of Selim's notorious wrathful outbursts that made them refrain from giving vent to their deep discontent. Generally speaking, the war in the East and its consequences proved unpopular with large parts of the Ottoman population.
Suleyman, probably upon the advice of the Grand Vezir Prii Mehmed Pasa, whom he had wisely kept in office, took measures which many of his subjects awaited and welcomed. These measures are referred to favorably in most Ottoman records: in the first place, the revival of commercial traffic with Iran together with some provisions including the return of goods which had been abusively seized within the frame of the blockade during the preceding reign. Along with these measures of appeasement, there was an immediate change in military airns. Already in 1521 it was clear that the new Sultan set his eyes upon the Christian world which indeed represented a more obvious foe than the Kizilbas, who, although heretics, could still be regarded as more or less members of the same faith. Also, the Balkan expeditions were more promising in terms of booty than Azerbaijan which had been made desolate by fire and the systematic devastation brought about by the retreating Kizilbas before the advance of the Sultan's army.
As a whole it can be safely said that the first months of Suleyman's reign brought marked appeasement. The only noteworthy attempt at revolt is that of the beylerbeyi of Damascus, Canberdi Gazali. This revolt is worth noting because it is closely connected with Selim's policy with regard to the Safavids. There is a series of documents all of which lead to the same conclusion: already at the beginning of 1520 Sultan Selim could not have been unaware of Canberdi's contacts with the Shah, which were carried out quite openly. Indeed, Selim had grand vezirs executed for lesser crimes. That Selim could have overlooked such an act of misdemeanour, which was no secret to anybody in Syria, would have been quite inconceivable were it not for a report on the question by Biyikli Mehmed Pasa. Biyikli Mehmed Pasa expresses an assumption which, to our mind, is a sound one: We wonder whether the Sublime Porte had not given orders that this be so. More than one conjecture leads us to assume that Selim could himself have schemed such a connection for a definite purpose. In view of his dim past and his more than one act of treason, when he was at the service of the Mamluks, Canberdi could well appear in the eyes of the Shah as prone to revolt against the Ottoman sovereign. This sham revolt, as devised by the Sultan, was a means of enticing Shah Isma'il into Syria in order to support his partner. Thus, however much the Ottoman forces were averse to an attack in Iran, Selim had all reasons to believe they would steadfastly go to war if the fight was to be on Ottoman soil. Everything had been prepared to ensnare the Shah, but the Sultan's sudden death upset the whole scheme. We believe that thereupon Canberdi wanted to act on his own account and embarked on an untimely adventure. Such venture could perhaps have met with success a century earlier in the Mamluk empire, but he had not reckoned with the sound organization and the military might of the Ottomans. Canberdi's men were defeated near Damascus and he himself lost his life there. According to an Ottoman document, Shah Isma'il showed great distress when he heard the news.
At this juncture Suleyman was master of the situation. He started preparations for an extensive military expedition the aim of which was formally declared a mere few days before he left Istanbul on May 18, 1521. Much to everyone's relief the target was the Hungarian border but the Sultan let doubt hover about the whole campaign as long as possible. Until then almost everyone had felt that the Ottoman army would again take the road to the east. Evidently, it was in the interest of the Sultan to keep the Shah guessing and perplexed, hence on the defensive.
We have discovered in the Ottoman archives a considerable number of spy reports covering Iran and dating back to the first months of 1521. These reports show that the Sublime Porte was intent on finding out as clearly as possible the Safavid opponent's intentions, the size of his forces and how operational they were. These reports distinctly lead to the conclusion that the Shah at the time was definitely not in a position to launch an attack on Anatolia. The Sultan could thus safely proceed to Belgrade. There was no serious danger theatening his eastern frontiers. Moreover, although there is no proof of any joint planning, the news of Suleyman's departure westwards coincided in Azerbaijan with a particularly fierce attack by Uzbeks on Herat. The relatively small number of men the Shah could enroll for intervention in Anatolia was still further diminished as part of them had to be beld back ready to defend Khorasan against any possible threat.
But Suleyman had found a particularly effective way of dissuading the Shah from launching an offensive on Ottoman territory whilst he himself was busy in the Balkans. A series of documents so far unpublished, found here and there in the archives of the Topkapi Palace, enabled us to reconstruct an Ottoman diplomatic scheme of which nothing has been known so far, shrouded as it was in secrecy. Its primary short-term aim was to neutralize the Shah and eventually to embark on a gradual process of "disengagement" in the east.
In the spring of 1521, just at the time when Suleyman was leaving Istanbul and news of the Uzbek threat was reaching Azerbaijan, three Ottoman spies were arrested in Tabriz. This is not extraordinary per se. Two of these were ordinary agents who apparently served as guides and had not been briefed about the real aim of the mission in which they were involved. One of the two was after a while released and sent back to Anatolia. The other one managed to escape in autumn. As for the third one, he was a notable figure, who seemed out of place next to the other two. He was Sofi Mehmed Beg, previously a taster in the Imperial Palace and then deputy to the Bey of the Sanjak of Amasya.
Immediately following his arrest, which everything leads to believe was made in order to delude the onlookers as well as his companions, he was separated from them. He was then led to the vakilo-ssaltane Mirza Shah Hoseyn. This person ranked second only to the Shah himself. Sofi Mehmed Beg appears to have stayed in the retinue of Mirza Shah Hoseyn until the very end of his mission, about a year later.
During Sofi Mehmed Beg's stay in Azerbaijan at least three messages were despatched by the Safavid officials to the Ottoman authorities. We have access to these documents and their date can easily be determined. They all purport to a resumption of direct diplomatic relations between the two states. In this exchange of notes a feature worth noting is that while the rank of the Safavid sender becomes higher in the hierarchy with every ensuing message, the rank of the Ottoman addressee of these messages gradually runs to a lower level. Moreover, the Safavid sender, getting more and more anxious to receive some sort of an answer from the Sublime Porte, prompts the Porte by promising more and more concessions. A close study of the contents of these documents and their circumstantial content leads to interesting conclusions.
As outlined above, since the end of 1514 the Shah exerted all efforts, though in vain, to secure from the Sultan, failing the restoration of normal diplomatic relations, at least a "modus vivendi" which would allow to ward off the threat of a renewed Ottoman offensive. We do not know following what bargaining Sofi Mehmed Beg found himself back in Tabriz. There is no doubt, though, judging from indications gathered, that he was acting all along with full authority from the Ottoman seat of power at the highest level. This was apparently unknown to the last warring faction led by Biyikli Mehmed Pasa, who were still intent upon unrestrained war with the Shah. What is clearly apparent from the records is that, through his emissary, Suleyman was luring the Shah with what he had been yearning for during seven years: a dialogue. As could be expected, Shah Isma'il would not jeopardize such a prospect by inconsiderate military action.
Now the Sultan could just procrastinate. He knew his ncighbour would not attempt any threatening move. As a matter of fact, when Sofi Mehmed returned to Ottoman territory, in the spring of 1522, the Shah was still waiting for the longed-for reply. Suleyman was now quite confident. A few weeks later he left Istanbul for the Rhodes campaign. Sofi Mehmed's mission thus ended with a double success: on the one hand, neutralizing a potential adversary, on the other, by launching the policy of disengagement in the east as we have discussed. When the Ottoman army returned from Rhodes early in 1523, the all-out struggle against the Shah was already for all parties a distant memory, eclipsed by the two great victories by which the Sultan inaugurated his reign, victories in places where his illustrious forerunner and grandfather Mehmed the Conqueror had not succeeded -- at Belgrade where he opened the way for further conquest in Danubian Europe, and at Rhodes where he secured the hegemony of the Ottomans in the eastern Mediterranean and the safety of maritime communications with Egypt. Under these circumstances, the Sultan could condescend to grant the Shah that which he had long wanted. Sources studied so far say nothing regarding the dealings which took place in 1522 and 1523. In any case, the outcome is quite evident: Tajo-ddin Hasan Halife, Shah Isma'il's ambassador, presented himself before Suleyman in September 1523. The letter he was carrying, the contents of which we know, contained nothing suprising -- the Shah poured forth his protestations of goodwill and vows for the restoration of good relations. Condolenccs on the death of Selim and best wishes for the good fortune of the Sultan were skillfully woven in. Anyone who didn't know the contetl in which this took place would be hard put to guess that this apparently insignificant and stilted message was to end a decade of ruthless conflict. Suleyman's response at first glance attracts scarcely more attention except that beneath the rhetorical flourishes, no less accomplished than those of his correspondent, one can easily sense condescension and a carefully contrived lack of concern.
Everything we have seen until now would lead us to believe that as soon as he had secured reestablishment of a minimum level of diplomatic intercourse the Shah would avoid compromising this result by any hostile intrigues against the Ottomans which the latter would notice. Nothing of the sort! In October 1523, no sooner had Tajo-ddin returned to Azerbaijan when Shah Isma'il wrote to two of the Ottomans' most natural enemies in Europe, Charles the Fifth and Louis of Hungary, proposing an alliance and concerted military action, as part of which he was supposed to launch an offensive into Anatolia in April 1524. Also, though one can scarcely prove this given the current state of the evidence, it is probable that he opened reladons with Ha'in Ah med Pasa, the beylerbeyi of Egypt, who had proclaimed himself Sultan of Cairo in January, 1524. One of his counselors, Kadi Seyh Kebir Erdebili, is known to have played a role in the Ottoman-Safavid negotiations of 1 522. However that may be, these two moves brought no result. The revolt of Ahmed Pasa was crushed in August 1524, and as for an effective alliance with European states, this proved illusory given the risks and uncertainties of communications across the Ottoman territories lying between them. In any event, Shah Isma'il died in May 1524, a turning point in the history of the Safavid state. With the coming of the young Tahmasb, just twelve years old, Iran was plunged into a long series of internal conflicts between rival Kizlibas clan chiefs, who were incapable of seeing beyond the Safavid borders, much to the satisfaction of the Porte. It was only in 1534 that Tahmasb was finally able to rid himself of the tutelage of the clan chiefs, in whose hands he had been until then no more than a toy. It was at this moment that the Ottomans reopened hostilities.
Let us now consider briefly those essential elements in this scene of Ottoman-Safavid confrontation which were destined to persist or to be modified little by little during the reigns of Shah Isma'iI and Tahmasb. First of all, though it is scarcely necessary to repeat it, the confrontation was at no time a matter of Turks vs. Iranians. Shah Isma'iI, his Kizilbas warriors, and his Anatolian partisans were to the contrary more Turkic if anything than were the ruling circles of the Ottoman empire. This was to fade with time as the Iranian cultural influence took effect. But in this respect nothing had changed very much by 1530 relative to the earlier period -- the Kizilbas chiefs were the sons of those who had brought Shah Isma'il to power and, from a social and cultural point of view, scarcely different from them.
We have therefore taken care up to this point not to use the terms "Turk" or "Iranian" nor even ''Shi'i,'' to which we prefer the expression "heterodox," which at least allows us to avoid the most serious misunderstandings. What is apparent from his divan in Turkish is that the doctrine of Shah Isma'il is a kind of Turkish-Anatolian syncretism which only the right son of varnish can help pass off as a form of Islam. This official religion of the Kizilbas tribes was imposed upon an Iranian populace long accustomed to seeing their leaders behave in a more or less curious manner, and who themselves can be regarded either as Sunni or as Shi'i so long as one does not try to define too precisely what was Sunni and what was Si'i in late-l5th century Iran. As might be expected, the death of Shah Isma'il as a doctrinaire figure inspired by his own religion, led to the progressive marginalization of that religion, even though the Iranian Shi'i theologians, whose intellectual education far exceeded that of the Kizilbas, really saved the Safavid movement as an acceptable Islamic model, however heretical it may have seemed from the point of view of the Ottoman ulema. This subject, important as it undoubtedly is, has yet to be the focus of a study, although one can at least sketch the stages of this religious undertaking by Iranian intellectual circles. The consequences for our subject are far from negligible. On the one hand, from the time of the campaign of 1534-35, the Ottoman-Safavid conflict becomes a conflict between two states with different understandings of Islam, and no longer a conflict of Islam against pagans who are worse than giaours. On the other hand, the connections between the Safavid sovereign and the heterodox Anatolians started to loosen bit by bit.
Taken up with their own quarrels, the Kizilbas chiefs evidently played no role in the heterodox rebellion which enveloped Anatolia in 1526-7 and which the Porte was able to put down only with great difficulty.
The Porte continued to follow with care the situation in Iran as shown by various reports conserved at the Ottoman archives. The only event of note towards the end of the 1520's was the Zu-l-fekar Beg incident at Baghdad with consequences which were far from negligible. According to Ottoman and Safavid narrative sources Zu-l-fekar Beg (alias Nohud Beg), a nephew of the powerful Amir Han Mausellu Turkman, was governor of Kalkuran. In 1528 he made a surprise attack upon his paternal uncle Ebrahim Han, govemor of Arab Iraq, had the latter put to death, took possession of Baghdad, and set himself up as its ruler. Called to Khorasan, where he defeated the Uzbeks at Jam, Tahmasb was unable to react until the following year, when Zu-l fekar was put to death. Meanwhile Zu-l-fekar had thought he could save himself by making an act of submission to Suleyman. From that time on the Ottomans exploited this precedent in ordcr to lay claim to rights over Baghdad, which in effect become the objective for their subsequent campaign to the east.
Another Kizilbas deserter was able to tempt them still further. In 1530-1 Ulama Takalu, governor of Azerbaijan, disappointed in his ambitions, passed over to Ottoman territory and presented himself at court. This intriguing personality, whose lack of ability was constantly demonstrated later, was able to mislead the vezirs and even the all powerful Grand Vezir Ibrahim Pasa. The hatred which he vowed towards Seref Bey, the emr of Bitlis, caused the latter's disgrace and led, under the circumstances, to his taking refuge with Tahmasb and obtaining the Shah's support to rescue Bitlis, which his rival had besieged in his campaign for the emirate. The Shah gave him his support and went so far as to name him beylerbeyi of Kurdistan. In 1532 Seref was killed in combat while trying to retake his provincels. But the Shah was seriously compromised by this affair, which offered the Sultan yet another pretext for opening hostilities at precisely the moment when the satisfactory outcome of his conflict with the Habsburg empire left his hands free for the front in the East.
The campaign of the Two Iraqs was about to begin.