Barbara Jelavich, "Sarajevo," beg of Chapter 4 of her History of the Balkans, vol. 2, Twentieth Century, Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 106-114.

World War I, an event that was to complete the unification of the Balkan states, had its immediae origins in an event closely linked to the national and international controversies that have been previously examined. At the beginning of 1914 there was no indication that the year would end in unparalleled disater. In fact, the Balkan scene was relatively calm; after two years of conflict no power - victor or vanquished - was in a position to face a renewed period of warfare. Nor was the general diplomatic field unusually troubled. Two alliance systems, the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, were in existence, but they were basically defensive alignments, designed to preserve the status quo on the Continent. They had not prevented their members in the past from cooperating closely with states in the opposite camp on specific issues. Within the Triple Alliance, the allegiance of Italy was coming ever more into doubt. The Entente powers were weakened by the growing conflict of Britain and Russia over the control of Persia, despite their previous agreement on spheres of influence. Germany was the strongest single military power on the Continent, but Britain and France clearly predominated in the world imperial field. The British navy still ruled the seas. Although many minor disagreements plagued the rleations of the great powers, none were worth the launching of a major war.

With this general situation the question naturally arises what Balkan issue could have precipitated a devastating conflict, one that was to conclude with the final dissolution of the Habsburg and Ottoman empires, the downfall of the tsarist regime in Russia, and the disruption of world relations to the extent that a second even more devastating war was soon to follow. In the Balkan peninsula the danger spots remained the national questions that had not yet been resolved and domestic political conflicts that resulted in a high degree of instability. As far as the first problem is concerned, after the division of Macedonia and Thrace and the establishment of Albania, the Balkan nationalities had finally overturned Ottoman rule. The next national demands could only involve Habsburg territory or, in the case of Romania, Russian Bessarabia. There was little chance that the Romanian government would press its claims against either of its great neighbors. Romanians lived in large numbers in Transylvania, Bukovina, and Bessarabia. Romania, however, was in alliance with Austria-Hungary, and it was not in a position to intervene actively in any of these regions. In contrast, the attitude of the Serbian government toward the Habsburg South Slavs was far more complicated.

With the expulsion of the Ottoman Empire from Europe, the next immediate national problem concerned the South Slavic inhabitants of the monarchy, the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, in particular their relations with the Serbian state and with the central authorities of the Dual Monarchy. Two trends have already been noted among these people. Some parties emphasized the national interests of their particular nation - for instance, the Croatian parties of Starcevic and Frank, both of which called for the unification of what they defined as the Croatian lands, including Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina. Their goal was the formation of a Croatian national state that could be associated in a federal relationship, but on an absolutely equal footing, with Austria and Hungary. The Catholic church would play an important role here. These Croatian nationalists tended to have an antagonistic attitude toward Orthodox Serbs, whom some regarded merely as renegate Croats. The superiority of Habsburg civilization over that of Orthodox, ex-Ottoman Serbia was also emphasized.

The second trend of opinion was that represented by the Croatian-Serbian Coalition, which was extremely active in Croatian politics at this time. Since it was a combination of parties, the group had no single program. Basic to all sections, however, was the conviction that Serbs and Croats within the empire should work together and not allow either Vienna or Budapest to play one against the other as had often ben done in the past. The coalition was indeed the strongest single political organization, but it is difficult to judge its influence throughout the country because of the limited Croatian franchise. It is very important to note that the coalition stood for cooperation within the monarchy. Some students and intellectuals might indeed have foreseen a time when the Habsburg South Slavs would join Serbia, but this was certainly not the objective of the majority.

The choices efore the Serbs of the Serbian kingdom and the monarchy were wider. The Habsburg Serbs could obviously work with the Yugoslav parties seeking to establish a separate South Slav unit within the empire, or they could emphasize specific Serbian goals and seek an eventual annexation by Serbia. The Serbian government had even more options. First, it could follow past procedures and attempt to build a greater Serbia. This policy would set as a national goal the annexation of Habsburg lands considered Serbian, especially Bosnia, Hercegovina, the Vojvodina, and the sections of Croatia, Dalmatia, and Slavonia that had Serbian populations. Second, the concept of a Balkan federation had long been a standard item in revolutionary and national programs. Such an organization could unite Serbia with Bulgaria, Montenegro, and the Slavs of Austria-Hungary, should that state dissolve. A wider union could include Greece and Romania. Third, the Serbian leaders could adopt a Yugoslav program calling for the unification of all Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in a single nation. It should be noted here that the absolutely vital question whether this should be a federal or a centralized state received very little attention.

Of the three paths, that of a Balkan federation had the least chance of success. Its impracticality had been repeatedly demonstrated, most recently by means of the mutual conflicts and jealousies among the states apparent during the Balkan Wars. The complete break in relations and the deep animosity that had developed between Serbia and Bulgaria excluded a union between them at this time. The Yugoslav idea, however, did indeed receive a great deal of support from some sections of Serbian society, particularly from intellectuals and students, immediately prior to the war. A great attraction was the obvious fact that the program was both idealistic and practical. Should Belgrade be able to unite all of the South Slav lands, the resulting nation would have the potential of becoming a great power. It would, moreover, clearly be the predominant force in the Balkans. The doctrine was also a weapon in the hands of the Serbian government. After 1903 it did all it could to encourage and attract the support of the South Slavs of the Dual Monarchy. Since political agitation was dangerous after the 1909 crisis, the emphasis was placed on cultural activities. Belgrade became the center of exhibitions and meetings of artists, teachers, and writers. Close contact was maintained with groups within the monarchy that had Yugoslav programs. There was thus some support in Serbia for the creation of a great South Slav state, a concept that naturally involved the dissolution of the monarchy. Representing the opinion of only a small percentage of the population, largely the educated minority, the proponents of a Yugoslavia never adequately met the problem of the basis on which the unification would take place. This failure was to have disastrous consequences in the postwar period.

Though some were thus attracted to the wider concept, the great majority of Serbs thought in terms of traditional nationalism. This attitude was completely understandable. Serbia was an independent state; it had long historic and religious traditions that were not shared with the Croats or the Slovenes. After 1870 most national movements followed the previous Italian and German examples. Serbian nationalists thus wanted their kingdom to be "the Piedmont of the Balkans," a phrase that oculd have many meanings. Their major objective throughout the nineteenth century had been the unification of the lands they regarded as Serbian, including Bosnia, Hercegovina, Old Serbia, Macedonia, and the Serbian-inhabited lands of the Habsburg Empire. They also sought a union with Montenegro - a practical objective, given the conviction of most Montenegrins that they were indeed Serbs. Some groups, the equivalent of the greater Croatian parties in the monarchy, wished to obtain all of the South Slav lands, including the Croatian regions. Many had attitudes comparable to those of their Croatian-nationalist counterparts: they regarded the Croats as apostate Serbs.

The greater Serbian goal, like the Great Idea of the Greeks, was thus a state based not on strictly ethnic principles, but on the acquisition of lands that had historic associations or that had at some time been under the jurisdiction of the Serbian Orthodox church. The ideal was the territory included in the empire of Stephen Dusan, the greatest of Serbia's medieval rulers. The nationalists oculd be encouraged by the rapid progress that Serbia had recently made. As a result of the Balkan Wars the population of the kingdom had increased from 2.9 million to 4.4 million. Thus, despite the great disappointment over the Habsburg annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina, much had indeed been accomplished during the past century.

As we have seen, almost all Balkan national movements had carried an element of revolutionary conspiracy. Violence and terror, justified with high romantic rhetoric, had a major role in the accomplishment of specific objectives. Secret societies, with distinctive symbols, flags, oaths, and elaborate ceremonies, were also prevalent. Some of these such as the Filiki Etairia, the Bulgarian committees, and IMRO, were extremely successful in the organization of conspiracies that had important consequences for their national movements. This tradition was alive and flourishing in the Balkans at the end of the century.

Moreover, the intellectual youth in the Balkans was often attracted by the more radical social and poitical doctrines of the day. Like their peers elsewhere, not only were they nationalists, but they attacked the institutions created by previous generations. As a Bosnian writer expressed it: "Our fathers, our tyrants, have created this world on their model and are now forcing us to live in it." The extreme factions placed great emphasis on personal involvement and praised assassination and terrorism as expressions of creativity and liberation. Between 1910 and 1914 members of these groups in the monarchy achieved an impressive record of acts of violence against Habsburg officials. Their efforts included an attempt to assassinate Emperor Franz Joseph during his visit to Bosnia in May 1910. Further,

Added to this ready availability of young fanatics, the unstable political conditions in Serbia contributed to the dangers of the situation. After the Balkan Wars a major conflict developed between the Serbian military and the government headed by Nikola Pasic. The army, as could be expected, was the center of strong national enthusiasm; its spirit was high after the recent victories. Some Serbian officers, with sentiments similar to those of their colleagues in Greece who joined the Military League or those in the Ottoman Empire who supported the Young Turks, felt that the civilian government was holding back the nation. They disliked in particular the Radical Party, which they saw as a group of corrupt poilticians endangering the state. The immediate issue in 1914 was the administration of the newly annexed Macedonian lands, over which the army wished to retain jurisdiction. In June King Peter was forced for reasons of health to hand over his authority to his second son, Alexander, as regent. In the spring and summer of 1914, Serbia thus faced a domestic crisis, a major ingredient of which was the question of the ability of the government to control the military.

The intensification of Serbian national sentiment prior to World War I had led to the formation of two societies. The first, the Narodna Odbrana (National Defense), was founded in December 1908 at the time of the annexation crisis. It set up a network of agents in the South Slav lands. The second organization, Ujedinjenje ili Smrt (Union or Death), commonly known as the Black Hand, appeared in 1911. Primarily under military direction, it was headed by Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijevic, known under the pseudonym Apis. He had been one of the participants in the 1903 revolution; in 1913 he was chief of intelligence of the Serbian General Staff. He personally distrusted the civilian leaders. Like the Narodna Odbrana, the Black Hand had a Pan-Serb program. The aim, as stated in its constitution, was "the idea of unification of Serbdom; all Serbs, regardless of sex, religion or place of birth, can become members, and anyone else who is prepared to serve this ideal faithfully." It intended to use "revolutionary action rather than cultural," and therefore it was to remain secret. Its elaborate initiation ceremony was complete with candles, daggers, revolvers, and hooded figures. Like the Etairia in the previous century, the initiates had to swear an oath, which if taken seriously, implied wide commitments:

The two societies had many members in common, and the Black Hand could make use of the Narodna Odbrana's agents in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

The incident that precipitated a chain of events leading to the outbreak of World War I has been often recounted. On June 28, 1914, Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Habsburg throne, and his wife were assassinated in Sarajevo. The visit had been badly organized; adequate safeguards had not been taken to protect the visitors. The date was the anniversary of the battle of Kosovo, the Serbian national holiday. Many warnings had been given on the dangers of such a trip. The archduke was an obvious taarget for the six young men who succeeded in killing him. The actual assassination was carried out by Gavrilo Princip, who was in many ways typical of the revolutionary Bosnian youth. He had read widely in radical literature, and he especially admired Bogdan Zerajic, who had committed suicide after failing to assassinate a Habsburg official. They were all strong Serbian nationalistsa,and they were steeped in Serbian history. When one of the conspirators was arrested, he announced, "I am a Serbian hero." They had decided to murder the archduke because they associated him with the program of Trialism, which would have joined Bosnia with the other South Slav lands in an separate autonomous state within the monarchy. The acquisition of the province by Serbia would thus be further hindered.

The students had ben assisted in their preparations by Dimitrijevic, and they had received their weapons from Serbian government arsenals. Although all the details are not clear, it appears that the young Bosnians approached Dimitrijevic in Belgrade in May. He provided them with pistols and bombs and smuggled them back into Habsburg territory. When the central committee of the Black Hand heard about the action, it tried to intervene, but it was too late. Pasic too received reports that some young Bosnians intended to take action against the archduke and that they had been aided by Serbian officials in crossing the border illegally. No open and official action was taken. The Serbian representative in Vienna did, however, warn the joint minister of finance, who was reponsible for Bosnia-Hercegovina, in an oblique fashion. His words were not understood.

The Habsburg government had always been extremely sensitive about outside influences on the nationalities. In the 1850s and 1860s the unification of the Danubian Principalities and the accession of a foreign prince had been opposed because of the effect of a strengthened Roman state on Transylvania. In the 1870s strong opposition had been expressed to the creation of a large Slavic Balkan state for fear of the influence that it might exert over the South Slavs in the monarchy. During the years prior to the assassination ample evidence had been found concerning the ties between Serbia and some elements of the monarchy's Slavic population and the measures that had been taken in Belgrade to strengthen them. The Habsburg leaders were convinced that the assassination had been plotted within the Serbian government and that they would have to act decisively. The Habsburg foreign minister, Berchtold, and the chief of staff, Conrad von Hotzendorf, were the first to believe that a war with Serbia was necessary. They then persuaded Franz Joseph and Count Stephen Tisza, the Hungarian premier. Tisza would agree to strong measures only when he was assured that no Serbian territory would be annexed to the empire. The Habsburg officials, before taking decisive action, attempted to prove a direct connection between the Serbian government and the assassination; this they were not able to do. They also consulted with their German ally.

Having decided upon war, the Habsburg leaders handled the diplomatic preparations in an exceedingly inept manner. The assassination of the archduke had caused shock and disgust among the European statesmen. Had the Habsburg government acted at once, it might have exploited the general revulsion at this act of violence. Instead the entire matter dragged on from June 28 to July 23, when an ultimatum was finally delivered to Belgrade. The intermediate time was not used to prepare the ground adequately. Obviously, it was to the Habsburg interest to keep the war localized. The danger point was a possible Russian intervention in support of Serbia. After 1903 the relations between the two Slavic states had been extremely cordial, and Russia could be expected to react in some manner to a Habsburg threat to Belgrade. In their past Balkan policies the Russian and Habsburg governments had usually observed the principles of the balance of power: when one made major gains, the other should have compensation. Before going to war with the Ottoman Empire in 1877, Russia had negotiated the secret treaties that assured Vienna of advances in the western Balkans. In 1908, prior to the annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Aehrenthal had sought to make a similar bargain with Izvolsky. An austrian defeat of Serbia in 1914 would have completely upset the diplomatic balance in the region. Romania was still tied to the Central Powers, and after the Blakan Wars Bulgaria too turned to these states. The Young Turk regime in Constantinople was about to sign an alliance with Germany. Should Serbia be forced into a position of vassalage to Vienna, Russian influence would be excluded from the peninsula. If the Habsburg leaders felt that they could no longer tolerate what they were convinced were Serbian provocations, then the tsarist regime could not be expected to accept a humiliating defeat in a region where it had expended so much blood and money in the past.

Not only did the monarchy fail to come to an understanding with Russia, but, even worse, it did not consult its ally, Italy, despite definite treaty obligations. When the Triple Alliance was renewed in 1887, the two powers had agreed that, should it prove impossible to maintain the status quo in the Near East, then they would make changes only after consultation and on the basis of mutual compensation. Only a Habsburg annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina was excluded from this arrangement. The Habsburg government did not commnicate its intentions regarding Serbia to Rome precisely because it feared that Italy would demand some compensation. The violation of the treaty was to be one of the reasons why Italy was able to remain neutral after the fighting began.

The steps to be taken were also not adequately discussed in Berlin. William II and his chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, assured the Habsburg government that Germany would back whatever decision it reached concerning Serbia. This "blank check" allowed Vienna to determine policy for both alliance partners. The choice of methods was that adopted against Serbia in 1909: an ultimatum that was presented on July23. However, since the objective was war, not further negotiations, the document was designed to be rejected. It included the demands that strong action be taken to repress anti-Habsburg activities within Serbia and that Habsburg officials participate in the investigation of the assassination. In its reply the Serbian government agreed to all of the terms except this last point. In answer, the Habsburg government broke off relations, and on July 28 war commenced between the two countries. The question remained whether the conflict would be localized or whether it would draw in all of the powers.

Once Serbia was at war, the state that had to make an immediate decision was Russia. With great reluctance, the tsar ordered mobilization on July 29. Since the success of its plans depended on a quick victory against France before the Russian armies were ready to fight, the German government answered the Russian mobilization with a declaration of war on the two powers. Britain entered in support of its allies on August 4. In August 1914 Europe was thus finally dragged into a major war over issues closely connected with the Eastern Question and the Balkan national unification movements. Arguing over the question of "war guilt" is a futile exercise. In 1914 each state acted in the crisis on the basis of what it felt its best interests demanded. A fatal chain of events involved all of the belligerents in a type of warfare that they had not expected and for which they were not militarily, economically, or psychologically prepared.